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1. The Context
The sweeping electoral victory of Governor
Ronald Reagan and the Republican Party in
1980 changed the tune and direction of Ameri-
can defense debate. Reagan was riding a wave
of American nationalism emerging from frus-
tration over the lost Vietnam war and the
hostages drama in Iran. The public and the
media projected a picture of the United States
as weak, humiliated and, in general, not re-
spected in the world. Iran and Afghanistan,
Ayatollah Khomeini and SALT II became
symbols of the futility of listening to and
negotiating with other parties. Instead, it was
now time for American strength, tough words
and good deeds. The perceptions were perhaps
not the most accurate. The Carter administra-
tion had, in fact, engaged itself in a rather
remarkable, consistent effort at settling con-
flicts, establishing contacts and building a new
and different image of the United States: dur-
ing the Carter administration not one single
American soldier died in battle, in contrast to
almost all previous American administrations
during this century.
President Reagan immediately set out to im-
plement his program of ’restoring respect’ for
the United States: the major vehicles were a
rapid build-up of the military forces, unpre-
cedented in American peacetime history, and a
simplified picture of world issues, the Soviet
Union being the root cause of most problems.
If America was strong enough, the Soviet Un-
ion would not be obstructive and the rest of the
world would listen to the U.S.
2. The emergence of the movement
When the hostages were safely returned to the
United States, public attention came to focus
on the conflict in El Salvador. The Reagan
administration presented documents to support
its contention that the armed opposition was
supplied and directed from Cuba and the Soviet
Union. Increased American involvement was
initiated. However, all of this sounded too
familiar to American mass media, which, re-
membering their uncritical attitude in the initial
phases of the Vietnam war, began to ask im-
pertinent questions and send reporters on chal-
lenging investigations. A new fear began to
arise: maybe there were also dangers in Ameri-
can ’strength’ as there previously were fears
arising from its ’weakness’?
During the summer and early autumn of
1981, the determination of the Reagan ad-
ministration to implement its military rearma-
ment program was evident and it was success-
fully maneuvered through Congress. As this
was accompanied by statements from the
President and other top leaders on the use of
nuclear weapons, on survivability in nuclear
war and a renewed emphasis on civil defense
measures, worries intensified. When hospitals
all over the country received instructions to
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reserve beds for national emergencies, physi-
cians too became alarmed. Could it be that this
administration was not only trying to deter the
Soviet Union, as previous presidencies had
done, but was actually planning to fight a
nuclear war?
At the same time as demonstrations took
place all over Western Europe, teach-ins were
organized on American campuses, church
groups began to investigate the issue, physi-
cians began to lecture an ill-informed but
alarmed public about the medical effects of
nuclear war, and petitions were being circu-
lated ; the central theme of all these groups was:
freeze the nuclear arms race at present levels.
Enough is enough!
The anti-nuclear forces won a crucial battle
in Vermont, where on the traditional Town
Meeting Day, important issues are voted upon
at local community meetings. The question of
a nuclear weapons freeze was raised in 193
townships. The proposed resolution, asking the
big powers to freeze the nuclear weapon arsen-
als at present levels, was passed in 160 towns
and was rejected only in 18. As other towns
had passed the same resolution previously, it
meant that by March 2, 1982 the nuclear
weapons freeze proposal had been accepted by
175 towns in the small, rural state of Vermont.
As Vermont has a national reputation of being
a conservative state, this decision had national
repercussions, fueling the nuclear weapon
freeze campaign all over the country.
An immediate effect of the Vermont deci-
sion was to alert and increase support for the
nuclear weapons freeze in the U.S. Congress,
giving Senators Kennedy and Hatfield addi-
tional support in the Senate and House for their
version of the proposal.
In April, it was clear that the nuclear freeze
would be on the ballot for the November 1982
elections in California; in May the same was
true for Michigan. On June 12, 1982 one of the
largest demonstrations in American history was
arranged in New York, in conjunction with the
Second Special Session of the United Nations
on Disarmament. An estimated 800,000 people
marched peacefully through New York and met
in Central Park.
In late June, a version of the nuclear freeze
proposal was endorsed by the Democratic Party
National Conference in Philadelphia, and in
early August the freeze proposal was strongly
supported but narrowly defeated in the House
of Representatives (204:202 votes). By that
time, however, it was clear that the nuclear
weapons freeze would be up for referendum in
seven states, allowing about one quarter of all
American voters to express their opinion on the
issue. Such a large coordinated referendum is
without precedent in American political his-
tory.
Thus, in less than a year the public debate
over American defense policy has shifted dras-
tically. In May 1982, President Reagan offered
to negotiate with the Soviet Union on strategic
nuclear weapons and in early June made clear
that the United States would not ’undercut’ the
SALT agreements, only shortly before de-
scribed by his Secretary of State as ’fatally
flawed’ .
Although the public debate has changed, the
political decisions have not. In late July, the
Democratically controlled House of Represen-
tatives passed a record military budget. Within
the administration, plans for fighting a pro-
longed nuclear war were being perfected. The
initial positions taken by the United States and
the Soviet Union in the strategic arms talks
were far apart and did not promise any early
result, if anything at all.
Thus, after an intensive period of cam-
paigning, with some spectacular and surprising
successes, the nuclear freeze movement faces a
protracted struggle. Disarmament will not
come from one day to another, and not even a
freeze at present levels is easily achieved.
3. The nuclear weapons freeze
proposal
The freeze proposal appears in different forms
in different contexts, but the basic proposition
is identical all over the United States: The two
big powers are asked to ’adopt a mutual freeze
on the testing, production and deployment of
nuclear weapons, and of missiles and new
aircraft designed primarily to deliver nuclear
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weapons’. Also, the nuclear weapons freeze
should be verifiable and be regarded as a first
step towards reducing the nuclear arsenals.
Although the resolution seldom carries a date
on which to be adopted, it is generally re-
garded to be as immediate an undertaking as
possible.
The freeze concept is easily understood pub-
lically and, of course, assumes a stop of the
nuclear arms race at present levels. It is, then,
not a disarmament measure, at least not in the
first round. However, it contrasts sharply with
the stand taken by the Reagan administration,
which suggests that a ’freeze now’ would ce-
ment Soviet superiority and be disadvantageous
to the United States. Thus, President Reagan
would favour a ’freeze later’ when two things
have taken place: when the United States has
rearmed to balance the alleged superior Soviet
forces and when the two superpowers have
agreed to actually reduce their nuclear arsenals,
presumably to a lower level than now is the
case. It appears, however, that the Reagan
administration has had difficulties in convinc-
ing the public that the Soviet Union is in any
meaningful way ahead of the United States.
The ’freeze now’ proposal, in other words,
makes sense as the superpowers’ mutual vul-
nerability is too obvious. Rather, it appears
that many understand the Reagan counter-
proposals to be part of a delaying tactic, hop-
ing to defuse some of the public enthusiasm
about the freeze.
However, the question of the second (and
.following) steps becomes important, as the
freeze proposal clearly is aimed at achieving a
reduction below present levels. In his con-
tribution below, Professor Seymour Melman ar-
gues that a freeze, under most optimistic as-
sumptions, could not be implemented until
1987, by which time the arsenals of nuclear
weapons would be immense compared to pre-
sent levels. Thus, he supports more com-
prehensive approaches.
A proposal that explicitly addresses the
question what to do in a second step is the one
presented by Congressman Gore from Tennes-
see. Gore envisages a 15 year freeze and re-
duction agreement, the first five years freezing
at present levels and the next ten years design-
edly removing the most destabilizing strategic
nuclear weapons, MIRVed land-based inter-
continental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). As a
matter of fact, the number of warheads would
remain approximately the same, but the forces
would increasingly be moved into submarines,
which are less vulnerable, hence maintaining
the retaliatory second strike capability - the
premise of nuclear deterrence.
A particularly important feature of the freeze
proposal, probably accounting largely for its
success, has been its emphasis on bilateral
measures: both the United States and the
Soviet Union are expected to ’adopt’ a freeze.
Mostly, this has been interpreted to be a
negotiated settlement, as is clearly expressed in
Senator Edward Kennedy’s speech. As such
this is not a dramatically new step. SALT I and
SALT II could both be seen as partial freeze
agreements. SALT I held the number of laun-
chers of nuclear weapons at the then existing
levels. These numbers have now remained the
same for ten years. SALT II tried to address
the more difficult question of the asymmetries
in the nuclear profiles of the two sides as well
as handling the intricacies created by MIRV-
ing, i.e. the augmentation in the number of
nuclear warheads. Eventually, SALT II would
have frozen launchers at somewhat lower
levels than present but with a higher number of
nuclear warheads. Yet by 1985, a freeze
would, in effect, have been operative. The
freeze proposal, although much more com-
prehensive than SALT I and SALT II, thus
rests on an already established praxis.
However, negotiations do not easily arrive at
a positive result. At the negotiation table, small
numerical discrepancies suddenly become
major political obstacles. Thus, it could be of
interest to explore other ways in which the big
powers could ’adopt’ a mutual freeze. Profes-
sor Jerome Wiesner from the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology argues eloquently in
his contribution for the United States to declare
unilaterally a moratorium on the production,
testing and deployment of new nuclear
weapons. If the Soviet Union responded to
such a challenge, a mutual freeze would have
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been instituted without negotiations, and at a
much faster pace than would ever be the case
with bilateral negotiations.
Much of the discussion on strategic arms
control has concentrated on the question of
verification. The 1972 and 1979 strategic arms
control agreements were to be supervised by
national technical means, but in particular the
1979 agreement also provided for ways of
preventing the parties from hiding information
from one another. In the enclosed contribution
by Mark Niedergang, the basic arguments for
the verifiability of the nuclear weapon freeze
are outlined. As the freeze proposal suggests a
halt to testing, production and deployment of
nuclear weapons, it can basically lean on the
experiences and provisions of other agree-
ments ; in addition to the two cited above, we
can also mention the draft Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty. As to underground nuclear testing,
highly reliable methods seem to be available
and acceptable to the parties concerned. Also,
the deployment stage of major missiles can be
verified through the aid of satellites. More
intricate, and daring, is the proposition of a
production halt. Obviously, such a prohibition
would be crucial to the agreement, as clandes-
tine production would immediately undermine
the entire concept of the freeze. Niedergang
suggests precedents for verifiable production
bans, but it is hard to expect such halts to last
without provisions for on-site inspection.
However, the Soviet Union now seems to ac-
cept such procedures in principle.
A most interesting aspect of the freeze is the
inclusion of a freeze on testing of missiles. This
is an avenue that until now has not been
explored as extensively as, for instance, the
testing of nuclear explosives. Professor Miros-
lav Nincic indicates some of the important
advantages of such a flight test ban. Obvi-
ously, such a ban would be verifiable, and it
would, as Professor Nincic makes clear, prob-
ably be critical in curbing the strategic arms
race.
4. The future
The nuclear weapons freeze proposal has re-
leased an immense potential for popular ac-
tivity and channeled public anxiety into con-
structive action. It has stimulated a serious
discussion on many related issues outside the
small circles of experts. Thus, four leading
defense and foreign policy decision-makers
from previous administrations suggested in
early 1982 that the West could now start con-
sidering a declaration not to be the first to use
nuclear weapons. In exchange, they argued,
the West would have to strengthen its conven-
tional forces in Europe. However, closer
scrutiny suggests that this is not necessarily the
most logical conclusion. A no-first-use pledge
can be made in conjunction with an agreed
balanced force reduction, rather than with de-
stabilizing one-sided force increases. It is any-
how not rational to substitute the race in nuc-
lear weapons with a race in conventional
weapons under the pretense of doubtful balance
computations; Professor P. Terrence Hopmann
outlines a plausible approach to this problem.
Also, the question of anti-satellite warfare
has been brought to the forefront, not least as a
result of the successful American launching of
the space shuttle as well as Soviet manned
space expeditions. The existing satellites are of
utmost importance for the verification of any
arms control agreement. Also, they could play
a central role in fighting a nuclear war. Threats
to them would, thus, potentially impair verifi-
cation as well as increase fear about the inten-
tions of the other party. Ken Johnson points to
the urgency of also freezing the arms race in
space as a complement to the arms freeze on
earth.
The nuclear weapons freeze proposal has
suddenly broadened the American public de-
bate on defense issues. The Reagan adminis-
tration has had to change its vocabulary and try
to demonstrate its commitment to arms control.
It has been forced to present seemingly radical
proposals for reduction. However, at the same
time it has moved ahead with its vast military
acquisition program without much concern for
its effect on future arms control, national edu-
cation, welfare, housing or employment. Al-
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though a significant shift in the debate has
occurred and hundreds of thousands of people
have become involved, more is needed. After
all, Ronald Reagan pursues his program and
Ronald Reagan remains in power.
August 1982
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